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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates trends in absolute poverty in urban China from 1988 to 2002 
using the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys. Poverty incidence 
curves are plotted, showing that poverty has fallen markedly during the period 
regardless of the exact location of the poverty line. Income inequality rose from 1988 
to 1995 but has been fairly constant thereafter. Models of the determination of income 
and poverty reveal widening differentials by education, sex and party membership. 
Income from government anti-poverty programs has little impact on poverty, which 
has fallen almost entirely due to overall economic growth rather than redistribution.  
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Non-technical summary (500 words): There has long been controversy over 
the extent to which economic growth will reduce poverty. Some argue for 
“redistribution with growth” while others claim growth will “trickle down”. In post-
reform China, governments have tended to emphasise the primacy of growth, as 
expressed in Deng Xiao-Ping’s maxim “Let some get rich first”. However, whilst 
rapid growth has been achieved, it is often claimed that this has been coupled with the 
creation of a “new urban poverty”. A key concern has been with the distributional 
consequences of retrenchment within State Owned Enterprises and the resulting 
emergence of mass unemployment. The current Chinese government appears to have 
responded to these concerns by stressing the importance of a “harmonious society” 
rather than simply maximising economic growth. 
 
This paper examines recent trends using the 1988 to 2002 Chinese Household Income 
Project (CHIP) surveys. These surveys are representative of all urban residents in 
China and provide the most detailed accounting of income available. A limitation of 
the data is the omission of most rural-urban migrants from the surveys.  
 
Regardless of where the poverty line is set, it is clear that absolute poverty did fall 
over this period. The lower end of the income distribution has enjoyed rising real 
incomes. This is something of a paradox, given the emergence of large-scale 
unemployment in urban China after 1995. The explanation of this paradox is that the 
adverse effects of unemployment have been outweighed by strong rises in urban 
wages. 
 
It is true that the incomes of the poor have risen less than those of others. But this 
much remarked upon rise in inequality occurred mainly in the period 1988-1995 as a 
result of the withdrawal of various subsidies and transfers. Since that time, inequality 
is shown has been relatively constant. 
 
Income sources are decomposed to isolate the contribution of various anti-poverty 
programs - redundancy benefits, unemployment insurance and Minimum Living 
Standard. These programs are show to have little impact on poverty, which has fallen 
almost entirely due to overall economic growth rather than such redistributive 
measures.  
 
Many income differentials have widened from 1988 to 2000. Differentials by 
education have grown, although are still fairly modest by international standards. The 
gender gap has widened. Communist Party members have also enjoyed an increased 
premium, although this trend appears to have gone into reverse since 1999.  
 
From our analysis, urban China is growing out of poverty, at least when defined in 
absolute terms. However, there are several important caveats to this conclusion. First, 
our results apply only to registered urban residents, since most migrants are excluded 
from official surveys. Second, we do find that some inequalities have widened and 
that relative poverty has increased. Finally, we refer back to our findings on the 
ineffectiveness of government anti-poverty programs in reducing urban poverty. The 
government in China might be said to have gambled by heavily relying on economic 
growth to resolve many social problems including poverty reduction. One wonders 
what will happen if growth stops? 
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 1. Introduction 
 
There is widespread debate over the relative role of economic growth and public 
redistribution in poverty reduction. After experiences such as the very inegalitarian 
growth of Brazil observed by Fishlow (1972), an international consensus evolved in 
the 1970s for “redistribution with growth”. However, the 1980s saw the pendulum 
swing the other way, with a renewed emphasis being put on economic growth as 
central to poverty reduction. This stance was partly due to a belated recognition of the 
pro-poor growth of high performing East Asian economies (HPAEs) and the contrast 
with the crises in economically stagnant Latin America and Africa. Although the 
debate on redistribution and growth hinges partly on value judgements (for example, 
one’s degree of inequality aversion), it is clear that country experiences of how 
economic growth is actually distributed have been very influential in shaping opinion. 
Cross-country experiences after 1960 imply that, on average, economic development 
does not have a systematic effect on inequality (Fields, 1991). Since there is no 
systematic tendency for inequality to change during growth, it follows that, on 
average, one should expect growth to tend to raise the incomes of the poor on a one-
for-one basis. Again, cross-country evidence since 1960 supports this implication 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2000). However, these summary conclusions relate only to cross-
country averages and do not constitute an “iron law”. In practice, as the contrasting 
experiences of Brazil and the East Asian HPAEs show, country experiences may 
deviate substantially from the norm. 
 
The case of China is a particularly interesting one, not only because it is home to so 
many of the world’s poor. Since the start of economic reforms 1978, it has enjoyed 
exceptionally rapid economic growth and the emphasis on government redistribution 
has been greatly reduced. The official stance is close to the “trickle down” theories 
emphasised in the 1980s: in the words of Deng Xiao-Ping, “let some get rich first”. In 
the interests of promoting economic efficiency and hence growth, enterprises have 
been given more freedom in letting worker remuneration reflect productivity, excess 
workers in stated owned enterprises have been made unemployed and many state 
transfers have been removed. As Khan (1998) argues, post-reform, the Chinese 
government has tended to reject a “relief approach” to poverty reduction in favour of 
efforts to increase income generation. Indeed, Khan suggests that the reluctance of the 
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Chinese government to adopt a redistributive approach to poverty reduction may 
partly be a backlash against the extreme egalitarianism of the planning period. 
Clearly, the efficacy of China’s current strategy of emphasising economic growth 
over redistribution depends partly on the extent to which growth has actually reduced 
poverty.  
 
We focus on poverty in urban China. For a long time, this topic was neglected by 
policy-makers and researchers. Government anti-poverty programs focussed on rural 
areas and, in particular, on selected poor counties. As Khan (1998, p42) commented 
“China’s official poverty reduction strategy is based on the assumption that poverty is 
a rural problem.” Within academia, few studies focussed on urban poverty, in 
contrast to the large literature on income distribution and inequality more generally. 
This neglect of urban poverty arose partly from using low poverty lines – such as a 
“dollar a day”. Reflecting the great urban-rural divide in China (Knight and Song, 
1999), a significant proportion of the rural population fell below these poverty lines 
but only 1% of the urban population were classified poor. With urban poverty in 
China being defined so as to concern only a very small minority, it is scarcely 
surprising that the issue was marginalised by government and scholars alike.  
 
Things began to change in the second half of the 1990s with concern over what was 
seen as a “new urban poverty” caused partly by a wave of rural-urban migration and 
partly by mass unemployment following a program of retrenchment in state owned 
enterprises. These new forms of urban poverty differed from the old urban poverty 
which was often characterised as the “three withouts” – roughly corresponding to the 
disabled, the sick and the orphaned (Wong, 1998). By the turn of the century, opinion 
makers began to assert that urban poverty had risen during the 1990s, taking some of 
the shine off China’s exceptionally high rates of economic growth. For example, The 
Economist (2001, page 39) declared “And in the cities, absolute poverty is 
increasing…” while the Chinese government magazine Liaowang (27 June 2002) also 
argued that urban poverty had increased. Underpinning such commentary was a 
concern that rising urban poverty would lead to political unrest, jeopardising the 
reforms that had enabled China’s rapid economic growth (see Wu, 2004). However, 
urban poverty in China continued to be measured using low poverty lines such as “a 
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dollar a day” that, despite perceived adverse developments, still only categorised 
around 1% of the urban population as poor.  
 
In this paper, we use a range of higher poverty lines in order to consider more broadly 
how lower income urban households fared in the 1990s. We present new evidence 
based on the best available data-set on income distribution in China spanning the 
period from 1988 to 2002. We find that concern over adverse poverty trends in the 
1990s appear misplaced. There has perhaps been an over-reaction to the previous 
neglect of urban poverty in China, with unwarranted pessimism about the living 
standards of poorer households. In particular, we challenge the assertion that urban 
poverty rose in absolute terms. While this claim makes dramatic headlines, it is does 
not appear to be supported by the evidence.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the small existing literature 
on trends in urban poverty in China. Our own findings on trends in growth, inequality 
and poverty are documented in Section 3.  Section 4 shows the results of decomposing 
changes in absolute poverty, focussing on the roles of economic growth, 
unemployment and government anti-poverty measures. Section 5 uses multivariate 
analysis to explore the patterns of poverty in the four different surveys we analyse. 
Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Existing estimates of trends in urban poverty 
  
There are relatively few studies of urban poverty in China and these present 
seemingly contradictory conclusions on trends from 1988 to 2002. We confine 
ourselves to monetary measures of poverty, based on the use of household income or 
consumption as welfare measures, although we do not dispute that poverty can be 
viewed more broadly as having many dimensions (World Bank, 2001). Table 1 
compiles estimates of the headcount of the urban poor made by these studies of 
monetary poverty. Some studies report that poverty has increased in the 1990s, others 
that it has shown no trend and yet more that that it has fallen. In this section, we 
review these studies and attempt to adjudicate between them. The task of adjudication 
is made somewhat easier by the fact that all rely on one of two main sources of data – 
either the official NBS household survey results or the CHIP surveys used in this 
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paper. We argue that the CHIP data is preferable due to its fuller accounting of 
income but it is not clear that a difference in data accounts for the conflicting results 
on poverty trends. As previously discussed, both data sources cover only residents 
with urban registration hukou and so exclude most rural-urban migrants. 
 
Poverty analysis using the CHIP surveys has been restricted to a comparison of their 
results for 1988 and 1995 (Khan, 1998; Khan and Riskin, 2001). Anchoring the 
poverty line on the cost of obtaining 2150 calories per day, 8% of urban residents 
were estimated to be poor in 1988, rising to 8.8% in 1995. Taking a lower poverty 
line, anchored on 2100 calories per day, the rise was sharper – going from 2.7% to 
4.0%. These results are the most comparable to those we present later in this paper, as 
we take the same CHIP data, but add in surveys for 1999 and 2002. We do not dispute 
Khan’s analysis of the 1988 and 1995 survey, but show that the rise in poverty in that 
period was not sustained and indeed was clearly outweighed by the fall in poverty 
from 1995 to 2002. It seems likely that the CHIP surveys imply less favourable 
estimates of poverty trends that the NSB figures. For example, Khan (1996) used 
tabulated NBS data to estimate that poverty fell from 7.42% in 1989 to 5.9% in 1994. 
The discrepancy probably arises from the fact that only the CHIP surveys include in 
their income measure the various food and other subsidies to households that were 
gradually withdrawn between 1988 and 1995.  
 
However, the picture of rising urban poverty given by Khan’s comparison of 1988 
and 1995 finds some support by the recent study by Meng, Gregory and Wang (2005) 
using NBS data. A key feature of this study is that it estimates a different poverty line 
for each year (and indeed each region). Meng et al. report a rise in urban poverty from 
1988 to 1995 using either upper or lower bound estimates of the poverty line. 
Thereafter, poverty trends down but sufficiently slowly that even by 2000 the 
headcount remains higher than in 1988. Meng et al. argue that re-estimating the 
poverty line for each year is appropriate because it makes better allowance of the 
changing availability and price of foods, and for increased non-food requirements due 
to the withdrawal of various subsidies. These arguments have some merit, but the 
solution arguably causes greater biases than it corrects. In a period of economic 
growth such as urban China has enjoyed, people are likely to consume more 
expensive food, raising the cost of calories. As a result, the food component of the 
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poverty lines used by Meng et al. will be rising over time. Moreover, non-food 
requirements are estimated as a mark-up based on the non-food share of the poor. By 
Engels’ law, rising income leads to a rising non-food share and thus increases in 
estimated non-food requirements. Hence the non-food component of the poverty lines 
used by Meng et al. is also likely to be rising over time. Allowing poverty lines to rise 
in this way can lead to poverty appearing to rise despite increases in the real incomes 
of poorer urban residents.  
 
The other studies using NBS data adopt poverty lines that are fixed in real terms but 
produce no consensus on poverty trends when using poverty lines are set to be very 
low. Two studies find no strong trend. Fang et al. (2002) used a subset of the NBS 
data – one representative city from each province. Chen and Wang (2002) used the 
full NBS data-set but like most other studies were dependent on official tabulations 
(grouped data). When using low poverty lines such as a “dollar a day”, both studies 
find urban poverty fluctuate in the 1990s with no clear trends. Nonetheless both 
studies show marked falls in urban poverty in the 1990s when it is more broadly 
defined. More positive conclusions are made in two other studies of NBS income 
data. Wang, Shi and Zheng (2001) use interpolations from the officially tabulated 
grouped income and look for generalised Lorenz dominance from 1981 to 1999. They 
find that each year, with the exception of 1988, the generalised Lorenz curve of real 
income per capita dominates that for the previous year. This implies that social 
welfare rose year on year and hence poverty fell, regardless of what level the poverty 
line was set – so long as the line was constant in real terms over time. In perhaps the 
most authoritative study of NBS data, Ravallion and Chen (2004) devised a poverty 
line for urban China based on the cost of basic needs in collaboration with 
government statisticians that is likely to be adopted as China’s official poverty line. 
Comparing household real incomes with the line they derive, they estimate urban 
poverty rates to have been 2.07% in 1988, falling to 0.85% in 1995, 0.57% in 1999 
and 0.54% in 2002.  
 
How can we adjudicate between these seemingly conflicting results? Analysis of NBS 
data has reached mixed results when using low poverty lines – a dollar a day or 
thereabouts. The conflicting results of these studies using NBS data may be partly the 
outcome of using low poverty lines that define only a very small proportion of the 
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urban population to be poor. Surveys may be less reliable in obtaining estimates for 
the very poorest – there are particular problems in sampling them and results may be 
very influenced by low outliers. These difficulties are likely to be particularly acute 
given that nearly all the studies use only official tabulated data with rather crude 
groupings. This requires interpolation that may be particularly difficult when dealing 
with only the extreme low end of the distribution. Somewhat higher poverty lines that 
are fixed over time reveal an improvement in the living standards of low income 
urban households during the 1990s. Arguably, the work on the CHIP data is the most 
authoritative since these surveys provided the most comprehensive measurement of 
income. To the extent that the period 1988 to 1995 saw a large reduction in 
government transfers, not adjusting for this is likely to lead to too optimistic an 
assessment of poverty trends. However, until this paper, analysis of poverty trends 
using the CHIP data has been limited to a comparison of 1988 and 1995. This 
limitation is particularly important because concerns about a possible rise in urban 
poverty arose mainly after the onset of radical state-owned enterprise reform in 1995. 
 
3. New evidence on trends in poverty, inequality and growth  
 
3.1 Data and measurement 
 
This paper uses the Chinese Household Income Project surveys conducted by the 
Economics Institute, CASS, in 1988, 1995, 1999 and 2002 (Riskin, Zhao and Li, 
2001). The surveys use sub-samples from the main nationally representative 
household survey programme conducted by the government National Bureau of 
Statistics. As a result, the surveys are reasonably large and designed to be 
representative of urban China1. However, in practice, Chinese urban surveys cover 
only residents with urban registration (hukou), and so exclude rural-urban migrants2. 
 
A key strength of the CHIP surveys is that they provide a more comprehensive and 
accurate assessment of household income than official NBS data (see Khan et al, 
1993). Our measure of income follows the conventions proposed by Khan (1993) and 
as such has two differences from those used by the NBS and some other studies3. 
First, it includes the value of various state transfers and subsidies that were 
particularly important in 1988. Since these transfers have been eroded, excluding 
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them and focussing on private earnings would risk overestimating income growth and 
poverty reduction. The most important elements of these transfers in 1988 were food 
subsidies through the coupon system and housing subsidies. Second, it includes an 
estimate of imputed income from the rent of owner occupied housing. Rents rose 
during the 1990s, implying that a bias from their omission in the NBS estimates that is 
in the opposite direction to that from omitting subsidies. To adjust for changes in 
prices, we use the official province specific urban CPI figures. These allow for 
regional variations in prices. 
 
There is no official urban poverty line in China as yet, although separate poverty lines 
have been set for various cities in order to determine eligibility for benefits (Minimum 
Living Support). As discussed in the previous section, studies of urban poverty have 
tended to use poverty lines based around calorific requirements and tend to find only a 
very small proportion of the population to be poor. For example, Ravallion and Chen 
(2004) estimate that less than 0.5% of the urban population fell under their poverty 
line in 2001. Khan (1998, p8) criticises the “dismally low poverty threshold” 
commonly used, saying “To use such a poverty threshold is to start with the 
presumption that there is no urban poverty.” We have sympathy with Khan’s 
criticism of the very narrow definitions of poverty conventionally applied to urban 
China. It may still be useful for international comparisons or when applied to rural 
areas. However, restricting oneself to such a narrow definition of poverty means that 
what one concludes about the impact of growth or policy reform on urban poverty is 
of limited interest – pertaining as it would, in 2001, to less than 1% of the urban 
population. For example, in our CHIP survey data for 2002, it would lead to no 
households surveyed in Beijing being classified as poor. Arguably, rising living 
standards in urban China have made the use of a calorific anchor inappropriate when 
setting the poverty line, much as it is inapplicable to OECD countries. Researchers 
studying poverty in industrialised countries would not dismiss the topic merely 
because everyone in such countries could afford to buy sufficient calories. Arguably, 
as China prospers and industrialises, a narrow calorie-based poverty line becomes 
inappropriate. In this paper, we provide some estimates of poverty based on $2 and $3 
a day poverty lines (using 1985 PPP dollars). These lines are ultimately arbitrary but 
arguably more informative than lines which pertain to less than 1% of the urban 
population. 
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Some heat can be taken out of the debate over where to set the poverty line by 
“dominance analysis” – that is to say plotting poverty incidence curves against 
multiples of the poverty line to see if poverty comparisons are robust to the location of 
the poverty line (see Ravallion, 1992, for a discussion; Figure 2 and the surrounding 
discussion late in this paper provide an application here). As conventionally 
performed, dominance analysis requires that the poverty line is fixed in real terms – 
that is to say, the poverty line is an absolute one, rather than being a relative line that 
moves with average living standards. We adopt such an absolute concept of poverty in 
this paper and indeed this is central to our subsequent findings. We do not deny that 
poverty has an irredeemably relative aspect - indeed this is implicit in our preference 
for a $2 or $3 poverty line for urban China over a $1 or calorific line. Consequently, 
we also estimate the extent of poverty using a relative poverty line – specifically, half 
of median income in the year of the survey. Nonetheless, our central interest is in 
whether the urban poor have benefited materially from China’s economic growth and 
an absolute concept of poverty is required to answer this question.  
 
An important caveat to our argument is that the CHIP surveys on which we base our 
estimates of urban poverty are based on the government’s official sampling frame. 
This has the advantage of making our samples representative of all Chinese with 
urban registration (hukou). However, it excludes the “floating population” of rural-
urban migrants who lack urban hukous. This omission is regrettable since rural-urban 
migration increased dramatically in the period and rural-urban migrants were no doubt 
poorer as a group than residents with urban hukou. Nonetheless, all large-scale 
statistical studies of urban poverty in China in the period are subject to the same 
limitation as a result of the government’s failure to properly cover rural-urban 
migrants in its official statistics. The planned next round of the CHIP surveys will 
explicitly include migrants, but for now researchers are limited by the data available. 
For brevity, we will not continuously repeat this caveat and use the term “urban 
poverty” in this paper to refer to poverty rates among those with urban hukou. While 
important equity issues arise when considering rural-urban migrants – notably in their 
lack of access to government services compared to urban residents - there is no real 
suggestion that migrants as a group have impoverished themselves by moving to the 
cities. If any thing, the presumption is that migration has provided a means by which 
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they can escape poverty (Park, Du and Wang, 2004). What data we have on rural-
urban migrants in 1999 shows that unemployment rates among them are negligible 
(Appleton et al. 2002). By contrast, the second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of 
mass unemployment among residents with urban hukous. Employees in loss-making 
State Owned Enterprises found themselves laid-off and enduring long spells of 
unemployment (Knight and Song, 2005). If one is to look for potential losers from 
China’s reform process, our focus on the urban residents rather than the migrants 
seems appropriate. 
 
3.2 Trends in growth and inequality 
 
China’s real GDP per capita (nationally, not urban-only) is estimated to have grown 
by 7.4% per annum between 1988 and 2002. The CHIP data thus imply substantially 
slower growth - 5% per annum - in household real incomes per capita (Table 2 refers). 
However, this still implies a dramatic improvement in economic welfare. On average, 
urban Chinese households have around twice as much income per capita in 2002 as 
they did in 1988. There is also a marked change in the structure of income between 
1988 and subsequent years. Subsidies and income in kind constitute a much smaller 
part of total household income after 1988. Ration coupons were abolished and 
housing subsidies shrank from 18% of total income in 1988 to a mere 2.8% in 2002. 
This is important, as some studies of income inequality in China focus more narrowly 
on cash wage earnings. Neglecting to account for subsidies and in-kind, which have 
been largely withdrawn after 1988, will tend to overstate the rise in income during the 
period. In our data, the share of cash earnings by working household members has 
rose from 43% of all household income in 1988 to 60% in 2002.  
 
The more inclusive measure of income in the CHIP surveys probably explains the 
discrepancy between the growth estimates from that data compared to those from the 
larger household surveys conducted by the NBS. NBS data imply higher growth 
during the period – 6.8% per annum compared to 5.1% (Table 3 refers). CHIP data 
record slower growth in the period 1988 to 1995, as subsidies were withdrawn, and 
also 1999 to 2002, as housing items contributed a smaller share to total income. By 
contrast, CHIP data imply higher growth between 1995 and 2002 as housing rental 
values rose rapidly.  
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The focus of this paper is not on the average level of growth, but how growth has 
varied across the distribution of income and hence the impact on poverty and 
inequality. Table 4 reports income per capita at each decile; Figure 1 plots the implied 
annualised growth rates. The CHIP data show that income growth between 1988 and 
2002 is greater, the higher up the income distribution one goes. We have already 
noted that average incomes virtually doubled in the period. However, for the lowest 
decile, the 10th percentile, real income per capita only increased by a half (49% 
higher). For the highest decile, the 90th percentile, incomes increased by 130%. As a 
consequence, growth rates for the highest decile averaged 6.0% per annum, more than 
twice the 2.8% growth experienced by the poorest decile. 
 
The interval between the first survey in 1988 and the second in 1995 is largely what 
accounts for the unequal pattern of growth over the full period. Between 1988 and 
1995, incomes of the poor grew slowly: the poorest decile saw only slow growth in 
income in this early period (0.8% per annum). By contrast, the top decile enjoyed very 
fast growth of 6.1% per annum. In the subsequent intervals between surveys, the 
pattern of growth across the deciles is much flatter and less marked. It is true that the 
growth is slower at the poorest three deciles than at the median – but the differences 
are more muted - particularly in the latest episode, 1999 to 2002. Income growth for 
the most affluent decile is also below the median in these intervals.  
 
The fact that income grew less for poorer deciles than for more affluent ones implies 
an increase in inequality. This is demonstrated in Table 5 that presents a variety of 
different inequality indices. By any of the conventional indices, inequality rises 
substantially from 1988 to 2002. For example, the Gini coefficient rises from 0.24 to 
0.33. However, it is noticeable that most of the rise occurs between 1988 and 1995 – 
for example, the Gini coefficient actually falls slightly between 1995 and 2002. 
Looking at the numbers in more detail, there is a modest rise in inequality between 
1995 and 1999. There is outweighed by a fall in inequality between 1999 and 2002. 
The fall in inequality between the last two surveys is perhaps surprising given the 
evidence in Figure 1 that the poorer deciles experienced growth below the median. 
However this is outweighed by the fact that the most affluent also enjoyed below 
average growth.   
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3.3 Poverty trends 
 
The fact that incomes grew across the deciles implies that absolute poverty fell, so 
long as a reasonably broad poverty line is used. Figure 2 provides figures for the 
percentage of urban residents who are poor for a continuum of poverty lines. The 
poverty incidence curve for 2002 is below those for earlier years. This implies that the 
conclusion that absolute poverty has fallen is robust to the choice of poverty line.  
Measuring poverty simply in terms of the headcount of the poor is inadequate - we 
might refer to a wider class of poverty indicators, the P-alpha measures proposed by 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), of which the headcount is merely one (that when 
alpha equals zero). However, one corollary of the “first order” dominance revealed in 
Figure 2 is that poverty must also be lower in 2002 than in earlier years on any P-
alpha poverty index, regardless of what value of alpha we choose. Thus we can say 
that the poverty gap (P1) and the squared poverty gap (P2) are lower in 2002 than 
1988, irrespective of the poverty line chosen.  
 
Figure 2 is not  informative for very low poverty lines, like a “dollar a day” poverty 
line - this corresponds to a value of 1212 yuan per year in 2002 prices, or the point 
“12” on the graph. Less than 1% of the samples in each survey fall below such a line. 
Instead, we focus on two rather arbitrary poverty lines – a broad poverty line of $3 per 
day and a narrower one of $2. With the $3 poverty line, the proportion of urban 
people who are poor falls from 36.4% in 1988 to 8.5% in 2002 (Table 6 refers). With 
the $2 poverty line, the prevalence of poverty falls from 7.3% to 2.1%.  
 
Poverty also falls between each of the surveys for most poverty lines. The most 
noticeable case where the poverty incidence curves in Figure 2 cross is when 
comparing poverty in 1988 and 1995. Here, for low poverty lines that identify less 
than 6% of people as poor in 1988, we can see that poverty is higher in 1995 than in 
1988. This implies that living standards worsened for the poorest 5% of the 
population between 1988 and 1995. This helps to understand the finding in Table 6 
that, using the $2 a day poverty line, the poverty gap, P1, and the squared poverty gap, 
P2, are estimated to rise between 1988 and 1995.  
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Table 6 also reports poverty indices adopting a relative approach to poverty. 
Specifically it presents poverty indicators for when the poverty line is defined to be 
one half of median income per capita in the survey of that year (i.e. allowing the 
poverty line to rise with growth). Since the incomes of poorer urban residents have 
tended to grow less than average incomes, relative poverty has risen. Under this 
approach, relative poverty rises from 3.8% in 1988 to 12.8% in 2002. Relative poverty 
rises in all years although the increase is more pronounced between 1988 and 1995 
(when relative poverty reaches 9.3%) and more modest between 1999 and 2002 
(going from 11.8% to 12.8%).  
 
4.  Decomposing changes in absolute poverty 
 
Further insight into trends in recent poverty trends can be given by various 
decompositions. In this section, we use various decompositions to quantify the role of 
growth in poverty reduction; to explain the paradox of poverty reduction during the 
emergence of mass unemployment; and to gauge the effectiveness of China’s social 
security system. 
 
4.1 Decomposition of poverty changes into growth and distribution components 
 
The problem with focussing on relative poverty is that by construction it does not 
allow changes in average income to impact on poverty – relative poverty can only 
change if the distribution of incomes changes. However, it is growth alone rather than 
redistribution that has raised the living standards of the poor in this period. Since 
inequality has risen, the distributional changes have been unfavourable to the poor. 
Table 7 decomposes the change in poverty into growth and redistribution components 
following Datt and Ravallion (1992). Under this decomposition, we start by 
describing a poverty measure tP  in terms of the poverty line, z , its mean income, tµ , 
and tL , a vector of parameters fully representing the income distribution curve. A 
change in poverty over dates t  and t n+  is then decomposed as follows: 
 
RDGPP tnt ++=−+                                    (1) 
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Where the growth, G, and the redistribution, D, components are calculated as: 
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with a residual, R, remaining.  
 
For brevity, we decompose the headcount (P0) index only – decompositions for the 
P1 and P2 are not reported in the tables but give qualitatively similar results. The 
strong impact of growth in reducing poverty is evident from the results. For example, 
using the three dollar a day poverty line, we find that if the poor had enjoyed the same 
rate of income growth between 1988 and 2002 as the means of our samples, then the 
percentage of urban Chinese who are poor would have fallen by 34.9 percentage 
points. Since only 36.4% lived under $3 a day in 1988, such growth would have 
implied the virtual elimination of poverty as so defined. In reality, poverty fell by 27.8 
percentage points – still very impressive, but short of what would have happened had 
there been no change in the distribution of income.  
 
Table 7 shows that the distributional changes in income in the period have generally 
been unfavourable – as should be expected from the rise in inequality noted in Table 
5. More revealingly, the impact on poverty of adverse distributional changes is 
estimated to have been substantial. For example, Table 7 implies that had there been 
no growth in mean income between 1988 and 2002, the worsening of the distribution 
of income would have increased the headcount by 8 percentage points (a rise in 
poverty of over a fifth). The redistributional component of the decomposition of 
poverty changes is most marked when considering the interval between the 1988 and 
1995 surveys. For the narrower definition of poverty ($2 a day poverty line), the 
distributional component of the poverty changes is almost fully twice the size of the 
growth component. This implies that, for the very poor, adverse changes in the 
distribution of income outweighed the beneficial effects of general economic growth. 
The only exception to the unfavourable distributional changes is the period 1999-2002 
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when the income distribution improves slightly and so would have implied a 
reduction in poverty even without growth. 
 
4.2 Sectoral decomposition: the paradox of rising unemployment and falling 
poverty 
 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our results is that poverty in absolute terms has 
fallen at the same time as mass unemployment has emerged. Table 8 provides some 
insight into this paradox, presenting poverty statistics for 1995 and 2002 for 
households classified according to the economic activity of the household head. Of 
particular interest is the comparison between households headed by employed 
workers and those headed by the unemployed. However, the table also reports on 
those headed by the retired and by those who do not participate in the labour market 
for other reasons (e.g. attending domestic duties). Given these mutually exclusive 
groups, it is possible to decompose the overall change in the proportion living in 
poverty into the effects of changes in poverty within the groups and changes in the 
size of each group (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991). Specifically, if Pt is the total poverty 
indicator at time t and Pit the corresponding indicator for those belonging to a group i, 
then: 
 
PT-P0 = Σ (PiT-Pi0)ni0    intra-group effects 
+ Σ (niT-ni0)Pi0    inter-group effects 
+ Σ(PiT-Pi0)(niT – ni0)   interaction effects 
 
where nit is the proportion of the population in group i at time t. The interaction 
effects would be positive if people moved into groups where poverty was falling.  
 
The impact of the program of lay-offs in the state sector in the second half of the 
1990s is shown in the population shares of the various groups in Table 8. In 1995, 
only 0.4% of individuals in the sample lived in households headed by an unemployed 
worker. In 2002, this percentage had risen to 6.2%. Perhaps even more revealingly, 
the proportion living in households with employed heads fell from 80% to 71%. 
Although one might expect some increase in the proportion living in households with 
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retired heads due to an ageing of the population, our figures are consistent with some 
of the retrenchment in China having taken the form of early retirement rather than 
unemployment per se.  
 
Other things being equal, the emergence of mass unemployment would be expected to 
increase poverty. This is born out by the contribution of the population shifts shown in 
Table 8. For example, Table 8a uses the “two dollar a day” line. The results imply that 
the poverty headcount would have increased by 1.3 points, from its 1995 level of 7%. 
However, this is more than offset by falls in poverty rates within groups. For example, 
the fall in the headcount among those living in households with employed heads 
would imply a 4.1 point drop in the poverty headcount. This alone would account for 
four-fifths of the observed fall in poverty. Moreover, the interaction effects also imply 
falls in poverty because the groups that have grown in size – those headed by the 
unemployed and the retired – have also experienced the fastest reduction in poverty. 
The results are qualitatively similar when using the three dollar a day line, as in Table 
8b. 
 
Perhaps the most important reason why the rise in unemployment is not as disastrous 
as might be thought is because only a minority of households headed by the 
unemployed are absolutely poor. For example, just 7% of people in households 
headed by the unemployed have incomes of less than $2 per head per day in 2002. 
This is only a small minority, even if it is substantially above the 2% headcount for all 
urban people. If $3 a day was used as the poverty line, 22% of those in households 
headed by the unemployed would be poor. These figures are all the more remarkable 
because our poverty rates are measured by income, rather than consumption. Clearly, 
households with unemployed heads are finding sources of income other than their 
heads earnings to support themselves. This income is partly earnings from the spouse 
of the head (or other family members). In this respect, the high rates of female 
employment in urban China should be acknowledged.  
 
4.3 The effectiveness of China’s social safety network 
 
The Chinese Government believed that a universal welfare provisional system would 
assist in allowing it to pursue State sector reforms aimed at enhancing efficiency and 
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promoting growth. Such a system would transfer the financial burdens of welfare 
provision from State enterprises and would pave the way to further retrench State 
workers in the coming years. However, the decentralised fiscal system could not 
support a nationwide universal welfare system. Consequently, local – not central - 
governments have become the main players in welfare provision and they are also 
joined by firms in both State and private sectors.  
 
The CHIP data allows us to identify three kinds of welfare payment: payment made 
by work units4; unemployment insurance (UI); and Minimum Living Standard (MLS 
hereafter). Payments by work units took the form of hardship relief in 1988 and 1995; 
and redundancy benefits in 1999 and 2002. Unemployment insurance was begun in 
1986 and by 2000 covered about half of all urban workers (Chen, 2001). Minimum 
Living Standard allowance first launched in Shanghai in 1993 and eventually 
extended to 667 major cities and 738 county-towns by 2000 (Ministry of Civil Affair 
2000). However, despite the large geographic coverage, relatively few people 
received MLS – only 3 million people in 2000 (Shang and Saunders, 2001).  
 
Table 9 provides some data on these three forms of welfare payments and their 
impacts. The table first shows the rise of mass unemployment in urban China. In 
1995, only 5.55% households included a member who had been retrenched. This 
proportion almost quadrupled to 20% in 1999 and 2002. It is striking that relatively 
few of these households received any of the three forms of social welfare. In 1995, 
only 3% of households with retrenched workers reported receiving Hardship Relief or 
MLS allowance. The coverage of these schemes greatly expanded during the second 
half of the 1990s, but by 1999, only 21% of households with retrenched workers 
received income from these sources. By far the most common form of assistance was 
redundancy payments from work units, which were received by 18% of households 
with retrenched workers. The failure of these payments to reach the majority of laid-
off workers presumably reflects an inability to pay within failing work units. 
However, social welfare funded by central and local government did very little to 
support retrenched workers who were not supported by former work units - both 
unemployment insurance and MLS allowance reached only an insignificant 
proportion of households with laid-off workers (1% and 2% respectively). By 2002, 
financial support from work units had dwindled to a trickle as the government 
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assumed responsibility for social welfare and required laid-off workers to end their 
contractual links with their work units. State funded welfare coverage had increased 
but still reached only a small minority of affected households. Of those households 
with retrenched workers, only 11% benefited from unemployment insurance and 8% 
from MLS.  
 
To gauge the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s effort in fighting poverty, we 
counterfactually remove all the three anti-poverty measures from household incomes 
and compute poverty and inequality statistics. Implicitly this makes a number of 
strong assumptions - for example, that households’ gross incomes would not vary if 
the measures did not exist - but the counterfactual is nonetheless interesting. As might 
be expected from their low coverage, the programs had essentially no impact on 
poverty or inequality. However, even in 1999 and 2002, they had only a small effect. 
Without the income from the programs, the Gini coefficient would have been 0.9% 
higher in 1999 and 0.6% higher in 2002. The poverty headcount, using a dollar a day 
poverty line, would have been 0.6% higher in 1999 and 0.4% higher in 2002. These 
small effects are understandable given the low coverage of the three anti-poverty 
programs. They indicate that there is a lot of scope for improving government 
programs against urban poverty. It may be a cause for concern that the rise in the role 
of the two state-funded anti-poverty schemes between 1999 and 2002 did not fully 
offset the decline in payments funded by work units.  
 
5. Patterns of poverty and inequality - multivariate analysis 
 
We have documented the fall in absolute poverty among urban residents in China 
from 1988 to 2002. Insights into the changing patterns of poverty can be provided by 
simple multivariate modelling. Following Appleton (2001), we use three estimation 
methods. The first simply uses Ordinary Least Squares to model the log of household 
income per capita. The second uses a probit to model whether the household is poor 
or not (where poverty is defined as income per capita of less than $3 per day for this 
purpose). The third estimation method is more unconventional: it censors household 
income per capita at the poverty line ($3 per day) and uses a tobit to estimate the 
determinants of the log of this censored income variable. This third method forms 
abridge between the more usual OLS and probit models - like the probit, it models 
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one measure of poverty (the gap between household income and the poverty line), but 
it does so in a way that produces coefficients comparable to those of the OLS model 
of income. 
 
Using these three estimation methods, we specify two kinds of model: reduced form 
models and full models. The reduced form models use a parsimonious set of variables 
capturing the human capital of the household head, household demographics and 
provincial dummy variables. The full models augment the reduced form models with 
dummy variables for the work-related characteristics of the household head - 
specifically, occupation, industrial sector and ownership sector. The reduced form 
models are interesting because they are likely to provide more comprehensive 
estimates of the effects of some variables - for example, education may affect income 
via occupation, so controlling for occupation will underestimate the overall effects. 
However, the full models are also useful in describing associations between work-
related characteristics and outcomes. 
 
5.1 Reduced form results - human capital and demographics 
 
Income differentials have widened over time by a variety by characteristics of the 
household head. The Table 10 presents some key results from the reduced form 
models. After 1995 in particular, there is an increase over time in the importance of 
the education of the household head in raising household income and reducing the 
likelihood of being in poverty. An extra year’s schooling of the head is associated 
with a 4% rise in household income per capita in 1988, rising to 8% in 2002. Being a 
member of the Communist Party is also associated with a widening income 
differential over time - rising from 17% in 1988 to 36% in 1999, although it falls back 
somewhat to 25% in 20025. The sex of the household also increases in importance 
over time - ceteris paribus, male headed households have 1% higher income in 1988, 
a wholly insignificant differential. However, by 2002, the differential has risen to 12% 
and is significant at the 1% level. Figure 3 illustrates these differentials, whose trends 
largely mirror those obtained by modelling the wages of individual workers in the 
surveys (Appleton et al., 2005). There are quantitative differences between the 
differentials in household income and in individual wages, however. Income 
differentials by the sex of the household head have risen less than wage differentials 
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by the sex of workers, because most households include both working men and 
working women. Conversely, income differentials between households whose heads 
are CCP members and those whose heads are not have risen more than the CCP wage 
premium, because CCP members often marry other CCP members. By contrast, the 
trends in income and wage differentials by education are almost identical, except that 
wage differentials rose between 1988 and 1995.  
 
Income differentials by age of the household head are also at their most marked in 
2002. Figure 4 plots out the quadratic relations between age and income estimated 
from the OLS models for household income in the four surveys. There was a clear rise 
in the returns to age between 1988 and 1995 and later between 1999 and 2002. 
However, the change in the age profile between 1995 and 1999 was different, with 
households with middle-aged heads enjoying less of an income advantage over those 
with either young or old heads. Initially, in 1988, there was a distinctly non-
monotonic relationship - the turning point for the quadratic was forty years of age in 
1988. Over time, that turning point has risen, until 2002 when it stood at eighty years 
of age. This implies that in 2002, contrary to the inverse U-relation estimated for 
1988, there is a monotonic relation between age and income for most of the range of 
interest.  
 
Throughout the CHIP surveys, a higher ratio of dependents to working age adults is 
associated with lower household income, as is a higher absolute number of adults. The 
coefficients on these two demographic variables fluctuate over time, with the number 
of adults being more negative in 2002 than 1988. 
 
Most of the results from the OLS income functions carry over to the probit and Tobit 
poverty functions. If anything, the rise in the returns to education and to membership 
of the CCP is more marked in the Tobit models - implying a stronger effect among the 
lower end of the income distribution. For example, between 1988 and 2002, the return 
to a year of education rises from 4% in both the OLS and Tobit functions to 10% in 
the tobit for 2002 compared to 8% in the OLS. CCP membership raises income in the 
tobits for 1999 and 2002 by twice as much as it does in the corresponding OLS 
income functions. There are also some differences in the effect of the sex of the 
household head. This never significantly affects the probability of being poor in the 
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probits. While coming from a male-headed household does appear to be a significant 
advantage in the OLS model in 2002, this is not true for the Tobit - although the 
reverse could be said of 1988 (when it is significant in the Tobit but not the OLS). 
 
5.2 Full models - the effect of job-characteristics 
 
We now turn to the “full models” which include various characteristics of the 
household head’s job - namely, occupation, ownership and industrial sector. Including 
these characteristics tends to reduce the estimated effects of some of the other 
characteristics of the head - such as their education and CCP membership. However, 
the trends discussed above remain robust to inclusion of job-characteristics. We begin 
by discussing the effects of job characteristics on the OLS models of household 
income. 
 
As Table 11 shows, ceteris paribus, those employed in foreign firms had significantly 
higher household incomes while those in private enterprises had significantly lower 
income. However, these differentials narrowed between 1988 and 2002. Conversely, 
the income gap between households whose heads worked in urban collectives 
widened over time, so that by 2002, this was appeared the least remunerative 
ownership sector to work in. 
 
Income differentials between household heads who were manual workers tended to 
widen over time. For example, professionals and clerks more than doubled their 
apparent advantage over manual workers between 1988 and 2002. Households whose 
heads were unemployed due to retrenchment had lower incomes than those with heads 
working in manual jobs. However, the extent of the differential fell markedly from 
1995 onwards. In 1995, the differential was -46%, significant at the 1% level. This 
differential fell to -25% in 1999 and -17% in 2002, significant only at the 10% level. 
These results suggest that over time, households with unemployed heads were more 
able to compensate for the loss in earnings by other means - perhaps increased welfare 
payments or, in 2002 when unemployment was falling, by the earnings of other 
members. The relative income of households whose heads were retired was also more 
favourable in 2002 than in earlier years: the model predicts that they have 39% higher 
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income than households with heads in manual work, while models for earlier years 
predict only insignificant differences. 
 
There has been a major change in household income differentials by industrial sector. 
In 1988, there were few significant differences, ceteris paribus, in household income 
according to the industrial sector of the household head. The default sector, 
manufacturing, appeared to pay no different from most other sectors and significantly 
more than government administration. Urban households whose heads worked in 
mining and agriculture, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors had higher incomes, 
ceteris paribus, than households whose heads worked in manufacturing. By 2002, 
these differentials had all been reversed. Mining and agriculture were associated with 
the lowest household incomes, followed by construction, retail and wholesale services 
and manufacturing. Heads who worked in other sectors had significantly higher 
household incomes, for example, those working in government administration had 
15% higher household incomes than those in manufacturing. These sectoral changes 
correspond to those estimated for individual wages, using the same CHIP surveys 
(Appleton et al., 2005).  
 
For brevity, we do not report the Tobit models for the full specification, preferring to 
concentrate instead on the probits for whether a household is not poor. There are 
fewer pronounced changes over time in the coefficients on job characteristics in the 
probits for households being non-poor than in the OLS income models. For example, 
the coefficients on ownership sector in the probit do not shift markedly. Among the 
occupational dummies, the main change is that, by 2002, households headed by clerks 
are significantly less likely to be poor, ceteris paribus, whereas in 1988, there was no 
such effect. The dummies for the industrial sector in which the head works do change 
substantially in size and sometimes sign, in line with what one might expect from the 
OLS results, but remain largely insignificant in both 1988 and 2002.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
China’s high economic growth is perhaps the most significant economic development 
in the world over the last two decades. Much of its significance has been in the 
improvement of rural livelihoods. Nonetheless, it also has important impacts on urban 
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China – areas that accounted for 39% of its population (in 2002). There has been a 
growing unease that this growth has been unequally shared and has led to the rise of a 
“new urban poverty”. Sceptics concede that economic efficiency and growth may 
have been promoted by urban reforms involving a reduction in subsidies for urban 
households and retrenchment of excess employees in State Owned Enterprises. 
However, there is concern that these same reforms may have increased urban poverty, 
by reducing transfers to low income households and inducing mass unemployment.  
 
In this paper, we have focussed on the real incomes of urban residents at the lower 
end of the income distribution in urban areas. Using CHIP surveys which include state 
subsidies and transfers in their measurement of household income, we have shown 
that living standards rose across the distribution of income from 1988 to 2002. This 
truth has been masked by conventional analysis of urban poverty in China which 
defines only a very small minority of the urban population – for example, the 1% of 
so defined as poor by using a “dollar a day” poverty line. We find evidence that the 
withdrawal of subsidies between 1988 and 1995 lowered the real income of the 
poorest in urban areas. However, this was subsequently outweighed by growth in 
other sources of income. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that – despite the rise of 
mass unemployment after 1995 – absolute poverty continued to fall, irrespective of 
where the poverty line was set. This implies that the concern that absolute poverty has 
risen during urban reform is misplaced. State-funded anti-poverty programs have 
expanded in urban China during this period, but still had very limited coverage and 
made little impact on poverty or inequality in this period. 
 
As well as changes in the level of urban poverty, the last twenty years have seen 
changes in patterns of income and poverty. Multivariate analysis of household income 
reveals that differentials by education, sex, age and Communist party membership 
have tended to widen from 1988 to 2002. Tobit analysis implies that these widening 
differentials apply as much to the lower end of the income distribution as much as, 
and perhaps more than, the top. Furthermore, there appears to have been a reduction 
in the protection afforded to the kinds of jobs previously favoured under the planning 
period - manual occupations in the primary and manufacturing sectors. These factors 
help to explain the rise in urban inequality since 1988. However, an important insight 
of the CHIP surveys is that the rise in overall income inequality was largely confined 
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to the 1988-95 interval. Neither the 1999 survey, nor the 2002 one, show a 
continuation of the rise in urban inequality after 1995. 
 
From our analysis, urban China is growing out of poverty, at least when defined in 
absolute terms. However, there are several important caveats to this conclusion. First, 
our results apply only to registered urban residents, since most migrants are excluded 
from official surveys. Second, we do find that some inequalities have widened and 
relative poverty has increased. Finally, we refer back to our findings on the 
ineffectiveness of government anti-poverty programs in reducing urban poverty. The 
government in China might be said to have gambled by heavily relying on economic 
growth to resolve many social problems including poverty reduction. One wonders 
what will happen if growth stops or there is a major recession? 
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Table 1: Compilation of estimates of poverty rates in urban China, 1988 onwards 
 Khan (1998) Khan 
(1996) 
Meng, Gregory and 
Wang (2004)  
Fang et al. (2002)  Chen and Wang (2002)  Ravallion 
and Chen 
(2004)  
Appleton and Song 
(this paper) 
Poverty 
line 
anchor 
2150 cal. 2100 cal. 2150 cal. 2100 cal. 
(upper) 
but varies 
2100 cal. 
(lower) 
but 
varies 
$1 a day $1.5 /day $1 a day $1.5 /day $2 a day 2100 cal. $2 a day $3 a day 
1988 8.00% 2.70%  2.63% 1.50%      2.07% 7.33% 36.36% 
1989   7.42% 2.62% 1.59%      7.05%   
1990   7.39% 1.91% 0.97%   1.00% 8.60% 20.70% 2.58%   
1991   4.73% 2.49% 1.29%      1.66%   
1992    3.62% 1.72% 2.09% 13.74% 0.80% 3.90% 13.20% 1.13%   
1993    5.33% 2.30%   0.70% 4.20% 13.80% 1.01%   
1994   5.90% 5.11% 2.63% 2.73% 13.18% 0.90% 4.60% 13.50% 1.19%   
1995 8.80% 4.00%  5.35% 2.57% 1.65% 10.27% 0.60% 3.00% 9.70% 0.85% 7.00% 23.81% 
1996    4.94% 2.28% 1.69% 8.41% 0.50% 2.60% 9.30% 0.61%   
1997    5.28% 2.48% 2.00% 9.21% 0.50% 2.70% 9.10% 0.70%   
1998    4.83% 1.85% 2.06% 8.86% 1.00% 3.40% 9.00% 1.16%   
1999    4.21% 1.70%   0.50% 2.20% 6.80% 0.57% 3.66% 12.39% 
2000    3.97% 1.71%      0.63%   
2001           0.50%   
2002           0.54% 2.88% 8.52% 
Data 
source 
CHIP CHIP 
 
NBS 
grouped 
NBS NBS Subset of 
NBS 
Subset of 
NBS  
NBS 
grouped 
NBS 
grouped 
NBS 
grouped 
NBS 
grouped 
CHIP CHIP 
 
Notes: (1) The most common source of data is the official NBS surveys, although typically researchers only have access to the grouped tabulations. The CHIP surveys are 
used in the original analysis in this paper and are discussed in the text. (2) Poverty lines are typically absolute, either working as multiples of $1 a day (Purchasing Power 
Parity adjusted) or calculating the cost of obtaining a certain amount of calories per person per day. Meng et al (2005) re-estimated their poverty line for each year of data. 
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Table 2: Basic information on urban household income per capita, Household 
Income Project Surveys 
 
 1988 1995 1999 2002 
Mean income per capita 4820 6673 8771 9853 
Median income per capita 4268 5365 7180 8365 
% of income from:      
1. Earnings of working members 43.2% 59.4% 51.7% 60.2% 
2. Income of retired 8.0% 13.5% 18.3% 16.7% 
3. Income of other non-working 
members 
0.5% 0 0 0 
4. Income from private or individual 
enterprises 
0.7% 0.5% 1.8% 2.7% 
5. Income from property 0.5% 1.3% 0.9% 0.6% 
6. Miscellaneous income (including 
private transfers and special income) 
4.45% 3.4% 2.2% 3.1% 
7. Subsidies less taxes (except housing 
subsidy and coupons) and income in 
kind 
15.3% 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
8. Ration coupon subsidy 5.2% 0 0 0 
9. Housing subsidy 18.4% 10.1% 6.5% 2.8% 
10. Rental value of owner occupied 
housing 
3.7% 10.8% 18.5% 13.9% 
Number of observations 9005 6929 3998 6835 
 
Note: yuan per year, 2002 constant prices. 
This and subsequent tables are based on authors’ calculations from the Household 
Income Project surveys of the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences. 
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Table 3: Growth rates of urban household income, CHIP and NBS data 
compared. 
 
 Chinese household income 
project (CHIP) 
State Statistical Bureau 
(NBS) 
1988-1995 4.65% 6.63% 
1995-1999 6.83% 5.42% 
1999-2002 3.88% 8.98% 
1988-2002 5.11% 6.79% 
 
 
Table 4: Urban household income per capita by decile, Household Income 
Project Surveys 
 
 1988 1995 1999 2002 
10th  2705 2855 3502 4024 
20th  3180 3542 4504 5134 
30th  3553 4142 5400 6203 
40th  3902 4709 6284 7271 
50th  4268 5365 7180 8365 
 60th  4663 6080 8159 9535 
 70th  5186 7040 9540 11035 
 80th  6019 8545 11506 13380 
90th  7477 11489 15030 17211 
 
Note: RMB Yuan per year, 2002 constant prices  
 
 
 
Table 5: Inequality in urban household income per capita, 1988-2002 
 
 1988 1995 1999 2002 
Gini coefficient 0.235 0.328 0.331 0.318 
Atkinson index ( with 1.5 
inequality aversion) 
0.123 0.238 0.244 0.225 
Generalised entropy (1) or Theil’s 
T index 
0.100 0.223 0.262 0.172 
Generalised entropy (2) or Theil’s 
L index 
0.091 0.184 0.193 0.170 
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Table 6: Urban poverty indices, with $2 and $3 a day poverty lines, 1988-2002 
 
 1988 1995 1999 2002 
With $2 a day poverty line     
Head count, P0 7.33% 7.00% 3.66% 2.08% 
Poverty gap, P1 1.17% 1.64% 0.92% 0.38% 
Squared poverty gap, P2 0.31% 0.62% 0.38% 0.17% 
With $3 a day poverty line     
Head count, P0 36.36% 23.81% 12.39% 8.52% 
Poverty gap, P1 7.50% 5.88% 3.12% 1.26% 
Squared poverty gap, P2 2.34% 2.28% 1.26% 0.72% 
With half median income poverty 
line 
    
Head count, P0 3.8% 9.3% 11.8% 12.8% 
Poverty gap, P1 0.59% 2.25% 3.00% 3.08% 
Squared poverty gap, P2 0.15% 0.86% 1.21% 0.12% 
 
Note: Poverty lines are in constant 1985 PPP dollars. One 1985 PPP dollar corresponds to 
1212 yuan in 2002 prices. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Decomposition of urban poverty changes into growth and 
redistributional components (headcount poverty index) 
 
 Growth 
component 
Redistribution 
component 
Residual Total change 
in poverty 
(a) $2 a day 
poverty line 
    
1988-1995 -6.02% 11.64% -5.95% -0.33% 
1995-1999 -4.09% 1.43% -0.67% -3.34% 
1999-2002 -0.96% -0.35% -0.28% -1.58% 
1988-2002 -7.19% 13.05% -11.11% -5.25% 
(b) $3 a day 
poverty line 
    
1988-1995 -25.87% 12.01% 1.32% -12.54% 
1995-1999 -13.42% 1.25% 0.74% -11.42% 
1999-2002 -3.35% -0.47% -0.04% -3.87% 
1988-2002 -34.95% 7.96% -0.88% -27.83% 
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Table 8: Decomposition of urban poverty changes by employment status of household head, 1995-2000 
 
a) $2 a day poverty line 
 
 1995 2002 Contribution of 
 
Population 
Share 
Poverty 
headcount 
Population 
Share 
Poverty 
headcount 
Population 
shifts 
Intra-group 
changes Interaction 
Employed 80.31 7.02 71.04 1.86 -0.65 -4.14 0.48 
Unemployed 0.4 31.03 6.19 6.97 1.80 -0.10 -1.39 
Retired 18.37 5.85 22.04 1.17 0.21 -0.86 -0.17 
Other non-
participants 0.93 17.91 0.73 9.33 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 
Sum 100 7.00 100 2.08 1.32 -5.18 -1.07 
 
b) $3 a day poverty line 
 
 1995 2002 Contribution of 
 
Population 
Share 
Poverty 
headcount 
Population 
Share 
Poverty 
headcount 
Population 
shifts 
Intra-group 
changes Interaction 
Employed 80.31 24.07 71.04 7.83 -2.24 -13.04 1.51 
Unemployed 0.4 50.58 6.19 21.85 2.92 -0.11 -1.66 
Retired 18.37 21.46 22.04 6.36 0.79 -2.77 -0.55 
Other non-
participants 0.93 36.32 0.73 28.67 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 
Sum 100 23.81 100 8.52 1.41 -16.00 -0.70 
 
Notes: all numbers are percentages. Poverty lines defined in $PPP 1985 prices.
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Table 9: The Impact of Social Welfare Payments on Poverty and Inequality 
 
 1995 1999 2002 
Proportion of households with  retrenched 
workers 5.55% 20.38% 20.12% 
Proportion of households with retrenched 
being helped by various anti-poverty 
measures 
2.86% 21.18% 18.04% 
(1) by work unit 2.34% 18.48% 1.96% 
(2) by unemployment insurance n.a. 1.10%  10.91%  
(3) by low income allowance 0.52% 2.33%  8.22%  
Actual gini coefficient 0.3277 0.3310 0.3181 
Gini coefficient excluding anti-poverty 
measures 
0.3276 
0.3341 0.3200 
Actual P0 ($3 poverty line) 23.81% 12.39% 8.54% 
P0 excluding anti-poverty measures 23.83% 12.96% 8.93% 
Total reduction in P0 ($3 poverty line) from 
anti-poverty measures 
0.02% 
0.57% 0.39%  
(1) by work unit 0.00% 0.41% 0.02%  
(2) by unemployment insurance n.a. 0.10% 0.18%  
(3) by low income allowance 0.02% 0.06% 0.19%  
 
 
 
Table 10: Reduced form determinants of income and poverty 
 
 Dependent variable 
(estimation method) 
1988 1995 1999 2002 
Income (OLS) 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.06*** 0.08*** 
Income gap (Tobit) 0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Head’s schooling (years) 
Non-poor (Probit) 0.16 *** 0.11 *** 0.17*** 0.19*** 
Income (OLS) 0.16 *** 0.20 *** 0.31*** 0.22*** 
Income gap (Tobit) 0.17 *** 0.35 *** 0.65*** 0.48*** 
Head is CP member 
Non-poor (Probit) 0.60 *** 0.69 *** 1.07*** 0.83*** 
Income (OLS) 0.01  0.04  0.06  0.11*** 
Income gap (Tobit) 0.06 ** 0.06  0.23 * -0.05  
Male-headed 
Non-poor (Probit) 0.19  -0.01 0.44  0.01  
Income (OLS) -1.18 *** -1.25*** -1.01*** -1.11*** 
Income gap (Tobit) -1.24*** -1.46*** -0.96*** -1.17*** 
Dependency ratio 
Non-poor (Probit) -5.04 *** -3.02*** -1.86*** -2.18*** 
Income (OLS) -0.31 *** -0.46*** -0.38*** -0.41*** 
Income gap (Tobit) -0.29*** -0.55*** -0.31*** -0.43*** 
Number of adults (log) 
Non-poor (Probit) -1.27 *** -1.20*** -0.59*** -0.84*** 
Number of observations  8993 6928 3998 6835 
Number poor  
(income < $3 per day) 
 2911 
(32.4%) 
1488 
(21.5%) 
445 
(11.1%) 
505 
(7.4%) 
 
Notes:  
 
(1) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at 5% and * at 10% levels.  
 
(2) Dependent variables: income = log of real income per capita;  
 
(3) Income gap = log of real income per capita; censored at $3 per day 
 
(4) Non-poor = 1 if real income per capita above $3 per day 
 
(5) Also included in models but not reported are provincial dummies and quadratics for age of household head. 
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Table 11: Effects of job characteristics on income and poverty 
 
 1988 1995 1999 2002 
 Income (OLS) Non-poor 
(Probit) 
Income (OLS) Non-poor 
(Probit) 
Income (OLS) Non-poor 
(Probit) 
Income (OLS) Non-poor 
(Probit) 
Ownership of head’s place of work (State owned enterprise as default) : 
Urban collective -0.09***  -0.52*** -0.16*** -0.48*** -0.17*** -0.44*** -0.20*** -0.45*** 
Private -0.22*** -0.45  -0.41*** -1.22*** -0.05  -0.07  -0.14*** -0.41*** 
Foreign  0.40***  1.11   0.21***  0.66   0.31***  0.20   0.17***  0.43  
Occupation of head (manual workers as default):  
Private business 
owner 
 0.01  -0.48*  0.12 *  0.33   0.33***  0.08   0.10***  0.07  
Professional  0.07***  0.40***  0.19***  0.69***  0.24***  0.53***  0.17***  0.70*** 
Administrator  0.15***  0.72***  0.26***  0.78***  0.26***  0.17  0.22***  0.69*** 
Clerk  0.05***  0.10   0.07***  0.13*  0.17***  0.25   0.12***  0.51*** 
Retrenched -0.23 * -0.71*** -0.61*** -1.41*** -0.29 * -1.73*** -0.19 * -0.97 * 
Retired  0.12   0.80***  0.08   0.17  -0.06  -0.24   0.33***  1.08 ** 
Other Non-labour 
participation 
-0.19 ** -0.94 * -0.08***  0.11  -0.03  -0.88 * -0.11*** -0.82  
Industrial sector head works in (manufacturing as default):  
Mining/agriculture   0.04 **  0.31***  0.06   0.19  -0.04  -0.18  -0.10 * -0.22  
Construction   0.00  -0.03   0.00  -0.27*  0.10***  0.30  -0.06  -0.47 * 
Transportation and 
communication 
 0.02   0.01   0.04   0.06   0.29***  0.99***  0.18***  0.56*** 
Wholesale & retail  0.04***  0.05  -0.04 * -0.12   0.06 ** 0.09  -0.03  -0.12  
Real estate & social 
services 
-0.05*** -0.29 * -0.02  -0.32 **  0.24*** 0.55***  0.07***  0.11  
Health & welfare 
services 
-0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.05   0.20*** 2.06***  0.18***  0.42  
Education -0.02  -0.12   0.06 *  0.10   0.23*** 1.33***  0.16***  0.60 * 
Scientific research  0.02   0.04   0.21***  0.57 **  0.23*** 1.29***  0.24***  0.83  
Finance  0.01   0.29   0.31***  0.97***  0.45*** 2.00 **  0.20***  0.37  
Government  -0.05*** -0.12   0.01  0.12   0.25*** 0.91***  0.14***  0.47  
Notes:  (1) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at 5% and * at 10% levels. 
(2) Dependent variables: income = log of real income per capita; income gap = log of real income per capita; censored at $3 per day; non-poor = 1 if real income per capita above $3 per day 
(3) For occupation, ownership and industrial sector, controls for “other” and “not in above” included but not reported. 
(4) Also included in models but not reported: head’s age and age squared education, sex and CP membership; dependency ratio and log number of adults; provincial dummies and quadratics for 
age of household head. 
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Figure 1: Urban income per capita growth 
rates by decile 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
   10th 20th 30th 40th 50th  60th  70th  80th 90th 
Percentile point
a
n
n
u
a
l g
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
88-95 95-99 99-02 88-02
 39 
  
Figure 2: Urban poverty incidence curves 1988-2002
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Figure 3: Income differentials, 1988-2002
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Income differentials by age of household 
head
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Notes 
                                                 
 
1
 For example, the 1995 survey covered 7,000 urban households from 68 cities in 11 
provinces. 
 
2
 The excluded “floating population” was estimated to constitute about 20% of all 
people actually in urban areas of China in 1995 and since then the proportion is likely 
to have increased. 
 
3
 Income is used rather than consumption because that was the focus of the surveys 
that we analyse. This may be significant as some work using the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) data on urban household incomes and expenditures finds that 
incomes rose more than expenditures during the period, reflecting an increase in 
savings rates (Meng et al., 2005).  
 
4
 Payments by work units were often to retrenched State workers and as such came 
into prominence in 1998 during the period of retrenchment. 
 
5
 This is calculating the differential by exp (β)-1 where β is the coefficient on CCP 
membership. 
